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JR. Norton v. General Teamsters: The
Disintegration of the National Policy on
Union Tort Liability
The Worker. The strike's been going on for four weeks. In the beginning we were together-nothinggot in or out of the shop. The boss gets
an injunction saying we can't block the entrances-what's a judge
know about these things. More and more people are crossing the line.
The union's strike benefits can'tpay for my mortgage, my car and with
Christmas coming ... Damn!
There's the supervisor looking so smug, like he knew the union
Maybe this rock will
would lose. We can't lose now, we can't lose ....
wake him up ....
The Owner: I feel bad for those people. I still don't know why they
went on strike. I told them there was no money for a raise this year.
Everything's gone up... taxes, social security, pollution controls ....
The competition keeps cutting prices-how do they do that? I just had
to say no-I can't afford to lose this business-it's the only thing I have.
I don't know why they wanted a union anyway-what good will it do?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A strike by its very nature is an emotional and potentially volatile event. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
guarantees a worker's right to engage in collective action.' Despite
this protection, the boundaries between protected activity and unprotected misconduct can become blurred during a strike. When individual emotions erupt into violence, questions of liability frequently
emerge. As a result, many courts grapple with the question of when it
is proper to hold a.union liable for the violent acts of its members.
1. Section 7, as amended, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the 86th Congress in 1959, is codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
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This Comment analyzes the different mechanisms for determining union liability arising from striker misconduct. The resolution of
union liability issues primarily involves determining the proper standard of proof. The United States Congress and the California courts
have adopted contrasting approaches to determine the appropriate
standard of proof.
In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 2 Section 6
of the Act rejected common law agency principles and mandated a
"clear proof" standard for determining union liability in the federal
courts. 3 In contrast, California courts, in two recent decisions, expressly rejected the federal approach and adopted a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard as the appropriate level of proof in state tort
actions against unions. 4 The federal standard reflects a national labor

policy favoring the institutional preservation of unions. California's
adoption of a lesser standard of proof illustrates the disintegration of

that national policy.
This Comment will compare the California approach with the
federal standard, and address other alternative methods for adjudicating union tort liability. Section II will compare the federal and California standards and review the positions taken by other jurisdictions.
Section III will analyze J.R. Norton v. General Teamsters5 in order to

understand the policy implications behind California's adoption of the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. Section IV will discuss
the continuing vitality of the federal standard and explain why sup-

port for a national policy appears to be crumbling. Section V will
conclude this Comment with some prescriptions for restoring the national policy on union tort liability.
2. The Norris-LaGuardia Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
3. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute shall be held liable in any
court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or
agents, except upon clearproof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of
such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (emphasis added). This Comment refers to section 6 as the federal
standard or "clear proof" standard.
4. See J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890,
208 Cal. App. 3d 430, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989); Vargas v. Retail
Clerk's Local 1428, 90 D.A.R. at 9364 (July 20, 1989). The dissenting opinion of P.J. Spencer
was an inspiration for this Comment. The California Supreme Court issued an order denying
review in Vargas and decertifying the opinion on November 7, 1989. 89 D.A.R. at 13354
(Nov. 7, 1989). Decertification means that the opinion cannot be cited for any purpose.
5. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
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The federal approach, with its higher standard of proof, protects
unions against unwarranted tort liability. States adopting a lesser
standard may expose unions to potentially crippling damage awards
without significantly benefitting the public. Reaffirming our national
policy can accommodate the interests of both unions and tort victims.
II.

COMPARATIVE TREATMENT OF UNION LIABILITY

An analysis of the standard of proof required to establish union
tort liability touches upon basic labor policies. Some states have
adopted policies directly contrary to the national policy expressed by
Congress. Perhaps the best way to understand the issue of union liability for a third party's tortious conduct is to visualize the varying
treatments on a continuum. At one end, under the California standard, unions can be held liable simply by establishing that the misconduct occurred within the scope of an agency relationship between the
union and the individual wrongdoer. 6 This standard represents a
form of strict liability. At the other end of the continuum, any form
of vicarious liability would be eliminated. 7 The federal standard can
be understood as a compromise lying between the two extremes.
A.

The Federal Standard

By passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress sought to
achieve a dual purpose. First, the reform was to limit the federal judiciary's involvement in labor disputes.8 Second, the Act sought to protect the rights of workers to organize and engage in collective action. 9
As a means of achieving these purposes, the "clear proof" standard
was incorporated as a part of the major reform effort represented by
the Act.'0
The Act's legislative history expressly recognizes the unique sta6. Id. at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
7. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Engineers v. Long, 362 So. 2d 987, 989
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev. denied, 372 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1979).
8. A "labor dispute" is defined in section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as:
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
9.

L. MERRIFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW

24-26

(1989) [hereinafter LABOR RELATIONS LAW]; S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21
(1932).
10. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1932).
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tus of unions." As noted in the Senate Report, the structure of a
union may resemble a corporate entity, but there are important distinctions.' 2 The foundation of the union structure is the local union. 13
Although the local union may range in number from under 100 members to over 50,000 members, it must be understood that at its core
the local union is a collection of individuals and not a monolithic entity. 14Most local unions are affiliated with a national or international
union but the local unions usually maintain varying degrees of control
15
and independence.
Since the union, at either the local or international level, is an
6
unincorporated association, it acts through its officers or agents.'
Given the volatility of a strike environment, even the best intentioned
officers may fail to control members.17 The union exists to serve its
membership. Conversely, individual members do not necessarily act
at the union's direction.' 8 A union may simply be unaware of an individual member's wrongdoing during a strike. 19 Even if a union is not
aware of its members misconduct, it may be liable under common law
agency theories once the plaintiff establishes a connection between the
wrongdoer and the union. 20 Given the sometimes precarious control
a union exercises over its own members, Congress enacted the "clear
proof" standard to provide reasonable assurance that a union would
be responsible for the misconduct of its members. 21
11.
12.

Id.
Id. at 20.

13. A. GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 182-84 (1979).

14. Id. at 182. Goldman notes: "Union members have not totally surrendered their prerogatives of self-governance. Rebellion against the local leadership breaks out frequently
enough in most unions to make the elected and appointed officials aware of their vulnerability
to an aroused and disgruntled membership." Id. at 184.
15. Id. at 184-86. The term "International Union" refers to those unions which have
affiliated locals in both the United States and Canada.
16. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 24001(a) (West 1985). This provision provides that an
unincorporated association such as a union is liable to third parties for the acts and omissions
of its agents "as if the association were a natural person." Id.
17. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 184.
18. Id.
19. S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1932). "The officers chosen by a union are
not employers of the membership. They have no control over their associates based upon the
power of determining whether or not [to] employ them." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
[Tlhe doctrine that a few lawless men can change the character of an organization
whose members and officers are very largely law-abiding is one which has been developed peculiarly as judge-made law in labor disputes, and .. .the courts should be
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the federal standard of
proof relieves unions "from liability for damages or imputation of
guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers
or members ....
*"22 The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA,

23
also known as the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"),
diluted the strength of the federal standard. The LMRA restored a

common law agency standard of proof in suits involving contractual
violations and other actions permitted under the NLRA as
amended. 24 Some observers viewed the LMRA as eliminating the
special protection previously provided to unions by the "clear proof"
standard. 25 Others interpreted the amendments as covering only a
certain segment of litigation involving unions. 26 In short, the LMRA
recognized that since unions were parties to contracts, they should
have the capacity to sue and to be sued. The text of the LMRA did
27
not address the issue of a union's liability in tort.
In 1966, the Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity by reaffirming the continuing vitality of the "clear proof" standard in federal
actions involving state tort claims against unions.28 In UMW v.
Gibbs, Gibbs sued the union for violations of the LMRA and on a
state tort conspiracy claim. 29 Gibbs alleged that the union engaged in
30
a secondary boycott and interfered with his coal hauling contract.
The jury returned a verdict against the union on both federal and
state claims. The United States district court then set aside the verdict on the LMRA claim but upheld the state tort claim with an
required to uphold the long-established law that guilt is personal and that men can
only be held responsible for the unlawful acts of associates because of participation
in, authorization or ratification of such acts.
Id.
22. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403
(1947).
23. The Labor Management Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-197
(1982).
24. Id. Section 301(e) of the LMRA states that "in determining whether any person is
acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1982).
25. See Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Unions, 49 KY. L.J. 295, 298-99
(1961).
26. See Cox, The Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HARv. L. REV. 274, 310 (1948).
27. Id.
28. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This case is also
recognized as a leading case on the concept of pendent jurisdiction.
29. Id. at 717-18.
30. Id. at 720.
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award of $30,000 in compensatory and $45,000 in punitive damages. 3 1
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme
32
Court reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court in Gibbs clarified several issues involving the
federal standard of proof. First, the Court held that the LMRA did
not repeal the "clear proof" standard. In fact, it probably retained
the standard since state claims might expose a union to punitive damages. 33 While the LMRA sought to equalize the treatment of employers and unions, it did not remove the special status afforded unions in
tort actions. Congress recognized that if unions were exposed to unnecessary tort damages, the national policy of improving working
conditions through collective bargaining would be jeopardized. 34
Additionally, the Gibbs Court attempted to define the "clear
proof" standard. The Court stated that finding a union liable in tort
requires greater proof than the "preponderance of the evidence" customary in civil actions, but less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard required in criminal actions. 35 The plaintiff must actually
convince the trier of fact that the union was responsible, rather than
merely tip the scales in his favor. 36 The purpose of the "clear proof"
standard is to require a close nexus between the union as a legal entity
and the alleged harm caused by a union member. Otherwise, the
union would face potential liability for the unauthorized and wrongful
acts of a single member. 37
In Ramsey v. UMW, the Supreme Court further clarified the federal standard by holding that only the agency and authorization issues
must meet the higher "clear proof" standard, while all other issues
are determined by a "preponderance of the evidence. ' ' 38 A union can
31. Id. at 720-21 n.6.
32. Id. at 721.
33. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966).
34. Id. at 736-37. The Court's concern is illustrated in the following passage:
The driving force behind § 6 and the opposition to § 303, even in its limited form,
was the fear that unions might be destroyed if they could be held liable for damage
done by acts beyond their practical control. Plainly, § 6 applies to federal court
adjudications of state tort claims arising out of labor disputes, whether or not they
are associated with claims under section 303 to which the section does not apply.
Id. Section 303 of the LMRA pertains to the prohibition against secondary boycott activity
and the availability of federal district court jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
35. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 737.
36. Id. The Court stated: "He is required to persuade by a substantial margin .
37. Id.
38. Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1971) (reversing
district court and Sixth Circuit rulings that all elements of an underlying anti-trust action must
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certainly be held liable for unlawful or tortious conduct. The Ramsey
Court, however, reaffirmed the necessity of the "clear proof" require39
ment before a union can be held responsible for the alleged harm.
To illustrate the application of the federal "clear proof" standard, it may be helpful to use the example of a business whose equipment is sabotaged during a strike. The business, as plaintiff, must
establish the connection between the union and the individual wrongdoer who sabotaged the equipment by "clear proof." The plaintiff
may establish other issues, such as the elements of the tort and damages, by a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Thus, the tort
victim has an effective remedy while the union risks financial liability
only where its responsibility is clearly established.
B.

The CaliforniaPosition

J.R. Norton was a case of first impression in California since the
state courts had not yet ruled on the appropriate standard of proof to
be applied in state tort actions against a union.4° The case resulted
from a strike by a Teamsters local against a major agricultural company's farming and packaging operations. 41 Shoving and threats by
strikers on the picket line as well as arrests of certain strikers led to an
injunction prohibiting further violence. 42 Further union member misconduct continued: replacement workers were threatened, a company's truck windshield was broken, nails and spikes were placed in
the roadway, strikers drove in front of company trucks in an unsafe
manner, and someone even shot at a replacement driver.43 The company wrote mailgrams to the union leaders complaining about the
strike conduct, but the union took no active steps to deter the conduct. In fact, the union actually provided one arrested striker with
legal representation and reimbursed his fine. 44
In response to the misconduct, the agricultural company sued
various individuals, the local union and the international union for
meet the "clear proof" standard). The dissent would hold that proof of the "unlawful acts"
must also be established by the "clear proof" standard. Id. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 310-11.
40. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 440-41, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
41. Id. at 435, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
42. Id. at 436-37, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
43. Id. at 436, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
44. Id. at 436-37, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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tortious interference with business. 45 A jury returned a verdict
against all the defendants. 46 The local union's share of the damage
award included $252,000 in compensatory damages and $360,000 in
punitive damages. 47 On appeal, the union contended that the federal
"clear proof" standard preempted state common law agency principles.48 The California court of appeal rejected the union's argument.
Thus, the appropriate standard for determining a union's liability re'49
mained a "preponderance of the evidence.
1. Agency Theory of Tort Liability
Under JR. Norton, the California courts have adopted common
law agency principles to determine union responsibility for tortious
conduct. 50 The broad phrase "common law agency principles" actually encompasses two distinct theories of liability. Under a general
agency test, a principal is liable for the conduct of its agent or employee where the principal has authorized, or later ratified, the agent's
actions. In addition, the acts of the agent or employee must be within
the scope of his authority or employment. 5' In effect, the agent is so

intertwined with the principal that the agent's tort is imputed to the
45. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 434, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 247, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 242 (1989).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 434-35, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The local union was the only party involved in
the appeal.
48. Id. at 437, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 249. The trial court instructed the jury on both the
federal and state standards of proof. Id. at 437-39, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51. The court of
appeal found this to be harmless error since any jury confusion worked to the benefit of the
union. Id. at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
49. Id. Section III discusses the federal preemption issue.
50. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 437-39, 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249-51, 254, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 242
(1989).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) states:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of a kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different
in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. An agency jury instruction given in JR. Norton stated, "[o]ne is the agent of another
person at a given time if he is authorized to act for or in place of such person or if his acts are
later ratified by such person. One may be an agent although he receives no payment for his
services." 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
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52

principal.
A second theory of agency liability is the doctrine of respondeat
superior.5 3 Respondeat superior imputes the agent's tortious conduct
to the principal if the conduct is "incidental" or "relates" to the employment relationship. 54 Under respondeat superior, the principal is
liable, without fault, provided the agent or employee acted within the

scope of employment. The existing, underlying relationship creates
liability for a principal. 55 For example, a company is vicariously liable when its driver is involved in an accident while on duty.56 Applying this test to a union during a strike, the existence of membership or
employment status alone exposes the union to liability.5 7
The general agency test departs only slightly from the federal
"clear proof" standard since the plaintiff still must establish the basic
agency relationship. 58 In contrast, however, the doctrine of respondeat superior completely departs from the federal protection given to

unions. While federal courts require a plaintiff to establish that the
union authorized or ratified the tortious act, the doctrine of respon-

59
deat superiorcan create liability if a relationship alone is established.

A union is more likely to face tort liability for strike-related misconduct under California's approach than under the federal standard. 6° The federal standard not only requires "clear proof" of the
52. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2295, 2338 (West 1985). Under general agency principles
there must exist an underlying relationship between agent and principal as well as authority for
the agent's actions. Id.
53. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5. In JR. Norton,
the jury instruction on respondeat superior stated:
It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the
principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority or employment. Such
conduct is within the scope of his authority or employment if it occurs while the
agent is engaged in the duties which he was employed to perform and relates to those
duties. Conduct for the benefit of the principal which is incidental to, customarily
connected with or reasonably necessary for the performance of an authorized act is
within the scope of the agent's authority or employment.
Id.
54. Id.
55. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 n.5, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
56. For a recent discussion on the doctrine of respondeat superior in California, see John
R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766, reh'g
denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 2591 (1989) (holding school district not vicariously liable for teacher's
sexual misconduct with student).
57. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
58. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 1985). This section defines an agent as "one who
represents another, called a principal, in dealings with third persons." Id.
59. J.R. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
60. Compare the text of the federal standard, supra note 3, and the discussion in Gibbs,
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actor's status with the union but also the union's connection with the
harm. 6' This federal approach balances the social policies of compen62
sating tort victims and preserving the union as an institution. Common law agency principles shift the trial's focus to the actor's status
without recognizing the national policies granting unions limited protection against tort liability. 63 The J.R. Norton court, in effect, has
elevated the rights of tort victims over the institutional preservation of
unions. 64

2.

Quantum of Proof

The JR. Norton court also held that a union's agency liability
can be established by the "preponderance of the evidence" instead of
the "clear proof" standard. 65 The court noted that the general rule in
California civil trials requires a plaintiff to prove a case by the "pre'66
ponderance of the evidence" unless "otherwise provided by law."
In the union context, this means a plaintiff must establish that a person associated with the union committed a specific act. 67 Eligible persons include officers, employees and union members. 68 The plaintiff
must also show that the tortious act occurred in the course of the
employment or agency relationship. 69 Under respondeat superior,
however, the plaintiff need only establish that the act was "broadly
incidental" to the relationship between the union and the individual
tortfeasor. 70 Of course, any specific tort has its own elements which
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text, with the JR. Norton jury instructions, 208 Cal.
App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
61. Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 309-11 (1971).
62. Id. See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1966).
63. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 439-41, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250-53, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 242 (1989). The
court summarized various federal policies before rejecting the application of the higher standard. Id.
64. Id. at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
65. Id.
66. Id.; CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
67. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
68. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 n.5, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
Since an agent need not receive compensation, a union sympathizer or family member engaging in tortious conduct incidental to strike activity arguably could be deemed an agent.
69. Under California law a union as an unincorporated association is liable for acts of its
members. CAL. CORP. CODE § 24001 (West Supp. 1990). See J.R. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 253. Section 2338 of the California Civil Code establishes a principal's liability for the tortious acts of an agent committed "in and as a part of the transaction of
such business . . . " CAL. CIv. CODE § 2338 (1985).
70. See Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal.
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also must be established. 7 1
This Comment now turns to the approaches adopted by other
jurisdictions in order to more fully appreciate the implications of J.R.
Norton. The approach in JR. Norton is similar to that taken by some
other jurisdictions but conflicts with others. Moreover, the liability
theories recognized in J.R. Norton are among the most damaging to
the national policy on union tort liability.
C. The Position of Other States
Several states have considered applying the federal "clear proof"
standard to state court tort actions against unions. 72 Courts in Massachusetts, North Carolina, Washington and Arizona have explicitly
rejected the "clear proof" standard in these actions. 73 In contrast,
Pennsylvania, Kansas, Michigan, Louisiana and Connecticut have expressly adopted the "clear proof" standard. 74 This Comment organizes the above states by those which have "little Norris-LaGuardia
Acts" and those which lack a statutory scheme. This dichotomy
graphically demonstrates the widely conflicting approaches among
the states, even where they share similar statutory schemes.
Another group of state§ has adopted alternative mechanisms for
resolving union liability issues. Florida and Rhode Island have not
addressed the quantum of proof issue but have rejected liability based
on the doctrine of respondeat superior.75 Virginia seems to have
adopted a unique approach to the burden of proof issue which requires a defendant union to prove an act was outside the scope of
6
employment once the agency relationship is established.7
This Comment will separately discuss England's statutory
scheme which allows for union tort liability but limits damage
awards. Analyzing the English approach is helpful because it represents a legislative treatment for union tort liability. The American
approach, which leaves the issue to the states, effectively erodes a uniform policy by default.
Rptr. 106 (1968) (holding employer liable for injuries to child which occurred while child was
passenger on tractor driven by uncle during work-uncle had been expressly told that no
passengers were allowed).
71. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.4, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.4. This Comment
focuses on the union's responsibility for tortious conduct not on the elements of the tort.
72. See id. at 440-41, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
73. See infra notes 78-97, 116-133 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 98-115, 134-158 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 163-182 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
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1. States with "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts"
After Congress adopted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932,
many states adopted their own versions of the Act. 77 Although using
nearly identical language, these states have reached diametrically opposite results regarding the application of the "clear proof" standard
to issues of union tort liability.
a. Rejection of "clearproof" in tort actions
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is something of an anomaly. The statute generally governs equity actions, yet the "clear
78
proof" language of section 6 addresses tort actions against unions.
Certain states adopted comparable statutory schemes, including the
"clear proof" language, yet their courts refused to extend any special
protection to unions facing tort actions.
i.

Washington

The state of Washington has a "little Norris-LaGuardia Act"
which includes "clear proof" language. 79 In Buchanan v. International Brotherhoodof Teamsters, a non-striking worker sued the union
for personal injuries allegedly suffered while driving through a picket
line.80 The trial court denied the union's summary judgment motion
and the Washington Supreme Court granted review."'
The supreme court recognized that applying a "clear proof"
standard could dramatically affect the case.8 2 Applying the higher
standard of proof "would be a substantial variation of the usual rules
of vicarious agency liability and proof thereof. '8 3 The court rejected
the union's plea to use the "clear proof" standard for two reasons.
77. LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 9, at 52.
78. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982); S. REP. No. 163, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1932).
79. See Buchanan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 Wash. 2d 508, 510, 617 P.2d
1004, 1005 (1980). The relevant state statute is codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.32.070 (1989). It provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held liable in any
court of the state of Washington for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members,
or agents, except upon clearproof of actual participation in, or actual authorization
of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
80. Buchanan, 94 Wash. 2d at 509, 617 P.2d at 1004.
81. Id. at 510, 617 P.2d at 1004-05.
82. Id. at 510, 617 P.2d at 1005.
83. Id.
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First, Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local 25, an earlier state

decision, had limited the state statute to equitable relief such as restraining orders, injunctions and contempt matters. 84 The court recognized that Titus was decided before the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in Gibbs, but chose not to extend the "clear
proof" requirement to state tort actions. 85 Second, by the state legislature's silence on the issue, the court presumed the legislature was
aware of Titus, yet had chosen not to enact remedial legislation to
86
protect unions in tort actions.
ii.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts has a statutory provision nearly identical to section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 87 In Tosti v. Ayik, a union was
sued for libel after publishing an article in the union newspaper. 88
The Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court held that the "clear
proof" standard did not apply in tort actions against unions. 89 The
court relied on the title of the Massachusetts act which referred to
injunction procedures in labor disputes. 90 The court also cited the
legislative history which expressed concern with liberalizing the
state's injunction laws. 91
Curiously, the supreme court cited both Ramsey 92 and United
Aircraft Corp. v. InternationalAssociation of Machinists93 which extended the "clear proof" statutory protection to tort actions. 94 The
84. Buchanan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 Wash. 2d 508, 511, 617 P.2d 1004,
1005 (1980) (discussing Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 383
P.2d 504 (1963)).
85. Id. at 509-10, 617 P.2d at 1005. For a discussion on Gibbs, see supra notes 28-37 and
accompanying text.
86. Buchanan, 94 Wash. 2d at 511, 617 P.2d at 1005-06. "Since [the Titus decision the]
legislature has met in 22 sessions. The legislature is presumed to know the decision and its
effect." Id.
87. Massachusetts' statute provides in part:
No officer.., and no organization, participating or interested in a labor dispute...
shall be held responsible or liable in any court for the acts of individual officers ...
except upon clearproof of actual participation in, actual authorization of, such acts,
or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 20B (1982) (emphasis added).
88. Tosti v. Ayik, 394 Mass. 482, 476 N.E.2d 928 (1985).
89. Id. at 488, 476 N.E.2d at 933.
90. Id. at 487, 476 N.E.2d at 933.
91. Id.
92. For a discussion of Ramsey, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
94. Tosti v. Ayik, 394 Mass. 482, 488, 476 N.E.2d 928, 933 (1985).
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court distinguished these cases because they involved "violent labor
disputes" and not general tort liability. 95 The "clear proof" standard

was not available since the libel action did not arise out of a "violent
labor dispute. "96 Where Washington relies on legislative acquiescence, Massachusetts strictly construes the statute and applies ordi-

nary agency liability principles to unions.
The Massachusetts interpretation runs counter to all federal interpretations of Norris-LaGuardia's section 6.97 The Massachusetts
and Washington cases demonstrate that state courts are not bound by
United States Supreme Court decisions construing identical statutes.
Attorneys with cases in state courts, therefore, may not rely on national policy principles.
b. Acceptance of "clearproof" in tort actions
Connecticut and Pennsylvania courts extended the "clear proof"
language in their respective statutes to tort actions involving unions.
Connecticut directly relied on Gibbs, while Pennsylvania evoked a
more general policy rationale. Both states accepted the national policy concern of limiting union liability.
i.

Connecticut

Connecticut has a "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" with a provision similar to section 6. However, Connecticut's statute uses the
term "proof" instead of "clear proof."9 8 In United Aircraft Corp. v.
InternationalAssociation of Machinists,9 9 the court rejected the em-

ployer's contention that the union should be held liable under a re95. Id. (citing with approval Nelson v. Haley, 112 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. 1953), and Buchanan
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 Wash. 2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980)).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Ramsey v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302 (1971). The Senate Report's original description
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act reads as follows: "to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in equity." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-114 (West 1989). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
No officer... and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor
dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, except upon proof of actual participation in, or
actual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of such acts after actual knowledge
thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. 161 Conn. 79, 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
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spondeat superior theory.°0

Since the state statute was similar to the

federal statute, the court chose to follow the United States Supreme
Court's construction of the "clear proof" requirement in Gibbs.'0
The court found that the legislature intended to require more
than common law agency proof to hold a union liable in a state tort
action.10 2 In United Aircraft, the plaintiff was able to meet the higher

standard of proof. There was evidence that officers and staff were
involved in planning and participated in violent acts.10 3 The court

found that such evidence was sufficient to hold the union liable, even
under the higher proof standard.' ° 4 United Aircraft illustrates that

under proper factual circumstances, unions can be held accountable
for the misconduct of its members.
ii.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania has a statutory provision which does not contain
the same "clear proof" language as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but
protects unions against unwarranted tort liability.'0 5 In Gajkowski v.

InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the state statute precluded the application of respon06
deat superior liability to unions.
Gajkowski involved a wrongful death claim against the union
10
arising when a security guard was shot by an intoxicated striker.

7

100. Id. at 85-86, 285 A.2d at 336. The court found "clear proof" and upheld liability but
remanded on the issue of damages. Id. at 97-98, 285 A.2d at 341.
101. Id. at 86-87, 285 A.2d at 336-37.
102. Id. at 86, 285 A.2d at 336.
103.

Id. at 96, 285 A.2d at 340-41.

104. United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 96-97, 285
A.2d 330, 340-41 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
105. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 206(h) (1964). The statute provides in pertinent part:
No officer ...

[nor] association ...

participating or interested in a labor dispute...

shall be held responsible or liable in any civil action . . . for the unlawful acts of
individual officers ... by the weight of evidence in other cases, and without the aid of
any presumptions of law or fact, both of-(a) the doing of such acts by persons who
are officers, members ... (b) actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such
acts, or of ratification ....
Id. (emphasis added).
106. Gajkowski v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 A.2d 533, 541 (Pa. 1988).
107. Id. at 535. The case is remarkable for both its tragic elements and procedural complexity. The court was reconsidering an earlier decision, reported at 504 A.2d 840 (Pa. 1986),
where it upheld a sizable jury verdict against the union. The union's request for rehearing was
granted after it had been driven into bankruptcy proceedings due to the judgment. Id. at 536.
For a critique of the earlier decision, see Comment, Local Union Liability Imposedfor Picket
Line Violence-Gajkowski v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 607
(1988).
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after ten weeks of peaceful picketing
The shooting incident 0 occurred
8
against a 3M facility.'
The Pennsylvania court found that the statute's overriding purpose was the protection of unions against damage awards resulting
from individual acts.10 9 Given this legislative purpose, the doctrine of
respondeatsuperior was deemed contrary to the statute.110 The court
reasoned that the statute reaches both individual and organizational
liability.t" The key distinction is that the organization, as an entity,
in an act, but can only "authorize" or
cannot physically "participate"
"ratify" an agent's action.' 2
The doctrine of respondeatsuperior imputes constructive participation to the union, even if the act was never authorized or ratified.' 13
In the first Gajkowski decision, the union's liability was predicated
upon the tortfeasor's membership status and the union's organization
of the picket line.' '4 This reasoning demonstrates how easy it can be
to establish a striker's relationship to a union or a union's involvement in the dispute. The second Gajkowski decision recognized that
imposing liability in such situations would jeopardize the institutional
stability of unions.' 15
When state and federal courts construe similar statutory language consistently, the results promote uniform judicial treatment of
union tort liability. The Pennsylvania and Cbnnecticut cases also
show how courts may take national policy considerations into account while adjudicating state matters.
108. Gajkowski, 548 A.2d at 536. Two picketers also were injured in the shooting. Id.
109. Id. at 537 (quoting with approval United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966)).
110. Id. at 543.
111. Gajkowski v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 A.2d 533, 543 (Pa. 1988).
112. Id. at 543-44. Justice Papadakos, in his opinion announcing the judgment of the
court, stated:
I think it can be plausibly argued that the term "actual participation in" in our statute is meant to refer to the exposure to liability of an individual officer or member;
and that an association or organization can only be found liable for damages if it
authorized or ratified the unlawful acts.

Id.
113. Id. at 541.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 544. "Some years ago, our legislature made the judgment that imposing such
liability on organizations or associations involved in a labor dispute is against public policy and
would tend to the destruction of labor unions, a fate to be avoided." Id.
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States Without "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts"

Several states have confronted the problem of union tort liability
without a guiding statutory scheme setting out the appropriate standard of proof. While some states have rejected the higher "clear
proof" requirement, other states have embraced this special protection for unions.
a. Rejection of "clearproof" in tort actions involving unions
North Carolina and Arizona rejected attempts to extend the
"clear proof" protection to state tort actions. Certain themes emerge
from these cases. First, the reach of Norris-LaGuardia's section 6
protection is textually limited to the federal judicial system.' 16 Second, the United States Supreme Court has chosen not to resolve this
particular conflict among the states. 117 Finally, legislative silence is
construed as an affirmative expression of public policy-if the legislature wished to protect unions, it would have enacted legislation.
i.

North Carolina

In R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, the
court faced the issue of whether a union was entitled to a higher standard of proof in tort actions. 1'8 During an organizing drive, the Steelworkers' Union published various leaflets which stated, in essence,
that the company did not care about its workers.' 19 When the company brought a state libel action, the union based its defense on section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 120
The state supreme court held that it was appropriate to use state
evidentiary standards. 12' Reasoning that the "clear proof" standard
116. See text of section 6, supra note 3.
117. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has denied certiorariin three of the cases under
discussion. See J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
890, 208 Cal. App. 3d 430, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989); United
Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (the state court protected the union); United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 954 (1963) (partially
shifting the burden of proof to the union).
118. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 270 N.C. 160, 174, 154 S.E.2d
344, 356 (1967).
119. Id. at 163-66, 154 S.E.2d at 349-50.
120. Id. at 167, 154 S.E.2d at 351-52. The union claimed that it had not authorized or
ratified the publication. The matter was before the Supreme Court on appeal from the trial
court's sustaining of a demurrer against the union. Id. at 167, 154 S.E.2d at 351.
121. Id. at 174, 154 S.E.2d at 356.
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was textually limited to "courts of the United States,"' 1 22 the court
noted that no United States Supreme Court case had extended the
"clear proof" standard to state courts. 12 3 The court's rationale reflects a fundamental tension in our federal system. States are free to
experiment unless the national government enacts a statute preempting the field. 1 24 Labor law occupies a unique legal position in that it is
both a national and a local concern and thus a victim of this fundamental tension.
ii.

Arizona

In Carter-Glogau Laboratories v. Construction Laborers' Local
383, the Arizona courts faced the issue of union liability for strikerelated misconduct. 2 5 Strikers allegedly committed numerous acts of
vandalism against Carter-Glogau property.1 26 The company was
awarded $118,672.62 in compensatory and $200,000 in punitive dam127
ages against the union.
The Arizona Supreme Court flatly rejected the union's contention that the trial court erroneously applied the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. 28 The court reasoned that Gibbs allowed states
to control strike-related violence.1 29 Since Gibbs did not grant unions
tort immunity, state courts were free to apply state evidentiary
30
standards.
The court then analyzed whether there was any mandate to apply the "clear proof" standard in Arizona public policy. The court
found no express mention of "clear proof" in the relevant statutes. '3'
Even more telling for the court was the fact that Arizona did not
122. Id.
123. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 270 N.C. 160, 174, 154 S.E.2d
344, 356 (1967).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.
125. Carter-Glogau Laboratories v. Construction Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz. 351, 736
P.2d 1163 (1968).
126. Id. at 353, 736 P.2d at 1165.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 354, 736 P.2d at 1166.
129. Id.
130. Carter-Glogau Laboratories v. Construction Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz. 351, 354,
736 P.2d 1163, 1166 (1968).
131. Id. at 354-55, 736 P.2d at 1166-67. The court was examining Arizona's labor relations statutes which are codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1301 to -1411 (1983 &
Supp. 1989). These statutes are commonly referred to as Arizona's "right to work" law.

1990]

Union Tort Liability

incorporate the federal standard when the voters approved the labor
legislation in 1947 and 1948.132 Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act existed at the time Arizona passed its labor legislation, the court held
that the legislature's failure to enact a "clear proof" standard reflected a deliberate policy choice. 1 33 The Arizona court's reliance on
legislative silence is yet another theme reflected in the cases.
b. Adoption of the "clearproof" standard in tort actions against
unions
Certain state courts have voluntarily adopted the higher proof
standard for union tort liability. The courts of these states defer to
the national policy of preserving the institutional stability of unions.
In Kansas, the adoption of the "clear proof" standard is additionally
supported by the judicial comity rationale.
i.

Louisiana

Louisiana does not have a counterpart to the section 6 "clear
proof" standard of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, yet its courts have
adopted the federal standard.134 In Melancon v. United Association of
Journeymen, the plaintiff, a strikebreaker, suffered physical injuries
and damage to his car in a fight with strikers. 135 The trial court's
36
dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
The appellate court simply adopted the "clear proof" standard
without comment. 37 The court agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support a connection between the union and the assault. 38
Louisiana's approach is difficult to analyze because the court did not
provide any rationale for its decision. The case suggests that a union
should not be financially responsible for the actions of individuals beyond the union's practical control.
Melancon is consistent with an earlier Louisiana decision which
also refused to extend liability to the union absent evidence of union
132. Carter-Glogau,153 Ariz. at 355, 736 P.2d at 1167.
133. Id.
134. See Melancon v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 386 So. 2d 669, rev. denied, 387 So. 2d
596 (La. 1980).
135. Id. at 670.
136. Id. at 669-70.
137. Id. at 670. The court stated: "The 'clear proof' required by the [Norris-LaGuardia]
Act is not present." Id. The court provided no reasoning as to why Louisiana courts should
be bound by the federal evidentiary standard.
138. Id.
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responsibility. 139 There are other states, without statutory schemes,
which have not only adopted the "clear proof" protective standard
but have provided detailed analyses of their decisions.
ii.

Michigan

Michigan does not have a statute mandating a "clear proof"
standard. Nevertheless, its courts chose to adopt the stricter standard
of proof. 140 In Sowels v. Laborers' International Union of North
America, several union members assaulted a fellow member working
as a supervisor. 1 4 1 The victim sued under a negligence theory but
raised agency liability for the first time on appeal. 42 The appellate
143
court affirmed the summary judgment in the union's favor.
In adopting the "clear proof" standard, the appellate court held
that unions were entitled to the federal standard's special protection,
especially in cases involving vicarious liability. 144 The court found the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in North American Coal Corp. v. Local
Union 2262 of UMW persuasive:
It has been clear to Congress for many years that imposition upon
unions of vicarious liability for the unauthorized acts of individuals
could easily mean the elimination of labor unions as a social institution in America ....
Irresponsible or violent acts by individual
workers (or by agents provocateur) if automatically attributable to
the union on the scene could, of course, serve to destroy it.5 But
14
such vicarious liability is repugnant to due process of law.
The Michigan court in Sowel considered the institutional preservation of unions to be a compelling consideration. 146 Large damage
awards could destroy a union. In addition, the national policy favor47
ing collective bargaining would be meaningless without unions. 1
139. See Roddy v. Independent Oil Workers Union of Louisiana, 181 So. 2d 285, 287-88
(La. 1965) (union may be liable where union members physically prevent replacement worker
from entering refinery but not for anonymous phone calls and harassment).
140. See Sowels v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 112 Mich. App. 616, 317 N.W.2d 195
(1981).
141.

Id.

142. Id. at 619, 623, 317 N.W.2d at 196, 198.
143. Id. at 625, 317 N.W.2d at 199.
144. Id. at 620-21, 317 N.W.2d at 197.
145. Id. at 620, 317 N.W.2d at 197 (quoting North Am. Coal Corp. v. Local Union 2262
of U.M.W., 497 F.2d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 1974)).
146. Sowels v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 112 Mich. App. 616, 620-21, 317 N.W.2d
195, 197 (1981).
147. See section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 1.
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iii.

Kansas

Kansas adopted the "clear proof" standard despite the state legislature's silence on the issue.1 48 In Hiestand v. Amalgamated
Meatcutters, the court reversed the trial court's award of personal injury damages against a union because the jury instructions allowed
liability based upon a preponderance of the evidence.14 9 The court
recognized that it was not bound to adopt the higher federal standard
of proof.11 The court also recognized that there were compelling reasons to retain the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in tort
actions against unions.1 5 Retaining the customary state standard
would ensure that all vicarious liability actions within Kansas would
52
be subject to the same evidentiary standards.1
Nevertheless, the court held that the equities favored adoption of
the higher standard. 53 The court reasoned that requiring the "clear
proof" standard in tort actions against unions promoted consistency
between the federal and state judicial systems, discouraged forum
shopping and guaranteed fairness, since not all litigants have access to
federal courts.' 54 In essence, the court found that judicial comity outweighed concerns of internal consistency.155
The Hiestand court also distinguished the standard of proof required for the different issues arising out of tort litigation involving
unions. The court held that the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard was appropriate for proof of the alleged act and damages
because the protective policy does not entirely eliminate agency liability for a union. 5 6 On the other hand, the plaintiff must have "clear
proof" of a union's actual participation, authorization or later ratification of the act before the union can be held liable. 5 7
148. See Heistand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 666 P.2d 671 (1983).
149. Id. at 759-60, 666 P.2d at 672. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's reversal of the trial court. Id. at 764, 666 P.2d at 675.
150. Id. at 763, 666 P.2d at 674.

151.

Id. at 763, 666 P.2d at 675.

152. Id. In addition, the same evidentiary standards would be applicable to all elements
within a case.
153. Heistand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 764, 666 P.2d 671, 675 (1983).
154. Id. at 763-64, 666 P.2d at 675.
155. Id. at 764, 666 P.2d at 675. The court stated: "Plaintiffs would have no reason to
commence actions in state courts attempting to avoid the clear proof standard of the federal
courts thereby bypassing Congressional intent." Id.
156. Id. "The burden of proof as to whether the tortious or illegal act occurred ... is by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id.
157. Id. See also discussion of Ramsey, supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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The Kansas approach recognizes the competing considerations
of the rights of tort victims and union's institutional prerogatives.
Kansas also introduces the element of judicial comity as a justification
for adoption of the "clear proof" standard. Kansas recognizes that
although torts may be a "local" concern, the issue of union liability is
158
a national concern.
3.

Alternative Approaches to Union Tort Liability

A group of states has addressed union liability issues without reference to the "clear proof" standard. These alternative measures illustrate the extreme positions. On the one hand, a jurisdiction may
shift the burden of proof toward the union once an agency relationship is established. At the other end of the spectrum is an approach
which sharply limits agency liability.
a. Shifting the burden of proof to the union
i.

Virginia

Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the quantum of proof issue, the court offers even less protection to
unions than those states that reject a "clear proof" standard. 59 In
United Brotherhood of Carpentersv. Humphreys, the court upheld an
$11,000 judgment against the union for an assault by union members
against a worker who decided to return to work during a strike.1 60
The state supreme court held that once an agency relationship was
established, the burden of proof shifted to the union to show that the
alleged act was not within the scope of employment. 161
The court did not provide an extended rationale for their decision, but it did find that unions were subject to common law agency
liability. 162 Implicit in this decision is the policy that unions should
be responsible for the actions of individual members during a unionrelated activity. This type of unrestricted agency liability equates a
union with any other corporate entity. The approach of California
courts is similar to Virginia's approach to union tort liability.
158. Heistand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 764, 666 P.2d 671, 675 (1983).
159. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 954 (1963).
160. Id. at 789, 127 S.E.2d at 103.
161. Id. at 787, 127 S.E.2d at 102.
162. Id. at 786, 127 S.E.2d at 101-02.
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b. Limitations on agency liability

Other states allow tort actions against unions on agency theories,
but reject the doctrine of respondeatsuperior. This line of cases defers
to the national policy favoring unions, without adopting a higher evidentiary standard.
i. Florida

Florida has taken a position contrary to that of Virginia by rejecting the doctrine of respondeatsuperior as a theory for holding unions liable in tort. 163 In InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers v.
Long, the Florida Supreme Court reversed a judgment awarded
against the union for $400,000 in compensatory damages and
$400,000 in punitive damages. 64 The plaintiff, an innocent bystander, was struck by high tension wires and became permanently
disabled.1 65 The wires had fallen when a worker hit them with ma166
chinery while being verbally harassed by picketing workers.
The court reversed based on a jury instruction that held the
union liable without first requiring proof of a connection between the
union and the accident. 67 The jury had been wrongly instructed to
find the union responsible for the tortious acts of its members because
"by and through their membership, [unions] are, as a matter of law
liable for the common law torts, negligent or intentional, of their officers or members." 1 68 The appellate court held that a union is liable
only upon proof of authorization, participation or subsequent ratifica69
tion of a member's actions.
The Florida court did not provide a detailed rationale for its decision nor did it use the term respondeat superior. Implicit in its approach, however, is a respect for the national policy favoring the
preservation of unions against unwarranted tort liability. The erroneous jury instruction created liability based on the wrongdoer's status
70
as a member rather than on the union's culpability for the harm.
163. See International Union of Operating Engineers v. Long, 362 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), rev. denied, 372 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1979).
164. Id. at 988.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 988-89.
167. Id. at 989.
168. See International Union of Operating Engineers v. Long, 362 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev. denied, 372 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1979).
169. Id.
170. Id.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 12:753

Florida does not exempt unions from tort liability, but it does require
1 71
convincing proof of their responsibility for the alleged harm.
ii.

Rhode Island

Just as Florida limited the agency liability of unions, Rhode Island has also chosen not to apply broad agency liability in tort actions
against unions.172 In Murphy v. United Steelworkers of America, a
management employee sued the union for personal injuries.17 3 A
striking worker threw a rock at Murphy, which struck him in the eye
causing a permanent loss of peripheral vision. 174 After a jury trial, the
court awarded $13,000 in compensatory and $150,000 in punitive
1 75
damages against the union.
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed this judgment because the trial judge had instructed the jury that the union
could be liable even for unauthorized acts.' 76 The erroneous instruction extended liability to the union for any act "incidental to the per177
formance of a duty that the agent ...was authorized to perform."
While the supreme court refused to adopt the federal "clear proof"
standard, it held that union tort liability must be predicated upon actual authorization, participation or ratification. 7 8 Even though the
striker was a member of the union, this alone did not establish union
liability.
Rhode Island does not eliminate a union's tort liability. It does,
however, limit common law agency liability to those cases where the
plaintiff establishes the requisite connection between the union and
the injury. 17 9 In other words, a union is not liable for the tortious acts
of individuals simply because they are union members.
Before turning to the English experience, it would be helpful to
summarize the themes which have emerged in this comparative analysis of the states. States have taken diverse and conflicting approaches
to the issue of union tort liability, even where they share identical
171.
172.

Id.
See Murphy v. United Steelworkers of Am., 507 A.2d 1342 (R.I. 1986).

173.

Id. at 1343.

174. Id. at 1343-44.
175. Id. at 1344.
176. Id. at 1344-45.
177. Murphy v. United Steelworkers of Am., 507 A.2d 1342, 1344 (R.I. 1986).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1345. The court acknowledged general agency liability principles, but found
such principles "not controlling as this court attempts to determine the liability of a labor
union for the tortious acts of individual members." Id.
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statutory language. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
has not addressed any of these conflicting state cases. Of course, the
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over any case which rests entirely
0
on a valid state law.' 8
Some dominant themes have emerged from this thicket of confusion. In every state surveyed, one may bring a tort action against a
labor union. In those states which treat unions like any other entity,
the policies of strict construction of legislative intent and concern for
the rights of tort victims predominate. 8" On the other hand, where
unions have received some measure of protection against tort liability,
the policies of institutional preservation and judicial comity are given
priority. 182 This Comment will now review the English scheme which
illustrates an alternative approach to union tort liability.
D.

The English Approach

An examination of the English experience helps place both the
federal and the various state approaches into better perspective. In
recent years, England has shifted its position on union tort liability.
This Comment will first review the earlier statutory tort immunity
granted to unions. This period of statutory tort immunity coincides
with the rise of unions' political power. Unions succeeded, through
the political process, in elevating their institutional prerogatives over
the interests of tort victims.
England's present statutory scheme will also be surveyed.
Although the present law repeals union tort immunity, it still provides significant protection against tort liability. The discussion of the
present statutory scheme is helpful for two reasons. First, the English
scheme provides a model for balancing the competing interests of unions and tort victims. Second, the policy change abolishing tort immunity illustrates a political, as opposed to judicial, resolution of
union tort liability issues.
180. The principles governing the Supreme Court's grant of certiorarican be found at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1257 (Supp. 1989). See also Sup. CT. R. 17.1 (1982).
181. Based on the above discussion, states which can be loosely categorized as strict constructionists include Arizona, Indiana, Massachusetts and Washington. A state which favors
the tort victim over the union is Virginia. As will be discussed below, California has adopted
both of these themes.
182. States which clearly favor the institutional preservation of labor unions include Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In addition, Kansas
also relied on the notion of judicial comity. See Hiestand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233
Kan. 759, 764, 666 P.2d 671, 675 (1983).
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Statutory Immunity from Tort Liability

The Trades Disputes Act of 1906 granted English unions immunity from tort actions.18 3 A union could not claim statutory immunity unless the alleged tort arose from a "trade dispute."184 The
statute's definition of "trade dispute" was so broad that it included
nearly any dispute involving workers, including political disputes.' 85
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 narrowed
the definition of a "trade dispute."18 6 The new definition effectively
eliminated political disputes from statutory immunity. 8 7 Unions
could still be held liable, however, for personal injuries in cases where
the tort did not arise from a trade dispute.1 88 The 1974 Act, however,
retained statutory immunity for unions against tort liability. 189 Thus,
whenever a union was sued, the court was required to consider
whether the tort arose from a labor dispute, and if so, the court dismissed the union as a party. 190
2.

The Current Statutory Scheme

Under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party rose to power
on a platform of curbing union power in Great Britain.' 9' With the
Employment Act of 1982, unions lost their statutory immunity in tort
183. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 4. This section provides:
An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters, or against any
members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the
trade union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on
behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court.
Id.
184. Id. § 3.
185. Id. § 5(3). This section provides:
[Tihe expression "trade dispute" means any dispute between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment
or non-employment, or the terms of the employment, or with the conditions of labour, of any person, and the expression "workmen" means all persons employed in
trade or industry, whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a
trade dispute arises ....
Id.
186. See Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 29.
187. Id. In listing the types of disputes which are included in the definition of "trade
dispute," the Act focuses on the immediate relationship between the employer and the union
members. Covered disputes include those over wages, contract terms, discipline, work rules,
union membership, facilities and negotiation procedures.
188. Id. § 14(2)(a).
189. Id. § 14.
190. See 47 L. HAILSHAM, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 574 (1984).
191. See Benedictus, The Use of the Law of Tort in the Miners' Dispute, 14 INDUS. L.J.
176, 188-89 (1985).

1990]

Union Tort Liability

779

actions. 192 Thus, the Employment Act restricts union power by potentially allowing tort liability.
Nevertheless, the English scheme extends important benefits to
unions. The Employment Act provides that unions are only liable for
tortious conduct which "was authorised or endorsed by a responsible
person."' 193 The statute proceeds to identify the types of "responsible" persons who can expose the union to liability, such as executive
officers or those authorized by union rules to act on behalf of the organization. 94 Another key provision in the statute allows a union to
"repudiate" a purportedly authorized act. 19 5 For example, if an officer encouraged violence, the union's executive board could disavow
the activity through timely resolution and publicity. 96 Finally, the
Employment Act limits the amount of monetary damages available
197
according to the size of the union.
The Employment Act does not set out a "clear proof" evidentiary standard. This allows a plaintiff to establish his or her case by a
"balance of probabilities."'' 98 Under common law, a union can be vicariously liable only upon a showing of authorization or ratification of
the action. 99 A person connected with the union may authorize or
ratify an action through union rules, specific office, delegation or custom. 2°° Absent a showing of express or implied authority, a mere relationship with the union is insufficient to establish tort liability. 20 1 In
other words, England places limitations on common law agency liability as applied to unions by not allowing recovery under broad re20 2
spondeat superior theories.
The loss of tort immunity is a serious blow to union power.
192. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 15. This section provides in part: "[s]ection 14 of
the 1974 Act (immunity for trade unions and employers' associations from certain actions in
tort) shall cease to have effect." Id.
193. Id. § 15(2).
194. Id. § 15(3).
195. Id. §§ 15(4)(b), (5).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 16. These limits do not attach to personal injury actions which do not arise
from a trade dispute. Id. § 16(2)(a).
198. This standard is England's description of the legal burden of proof in a civil case. It
is the practical equivalent of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. See 17 L. HAILSHAM, supra note 190, para. 19.
199. See Heatons Transport Ltd. v. TGWU, 3 All E.R. 101 (1972).
200. Id. at l10.
201. Id. Although Heatons involved a statutory proceeding against a union, it has been
cited as expressing the law on the vicarious liability of unions. See 47 L. HAILSHAM, supra
note 190, para. 578.
202. Heatons, 3 All E.R. at 110-11.
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However, when compared to their American counterparts, English
unions may actually have greater statutory protection. In some
American jurisdictions, the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorallows any
hot-headed union member to create potential tort liability for the
union. 20 3 By contrast, the English statute limits the number of individuals who can create liability for the union. 2°4 In addition, the statutory limits on monetary damages protects unions from financial
destruction while providing some redress to tort victims. 20 5 The English scheme also allows a union to effectively repudiate a wrongful
act, 20 6 which is not possible in some states.
The English approach teaches two important lessons. First, the
statutory scheme is predictable, thereby allowing uniform treatment
of union tort liability. Along with uniformity, the statute attempts to
balance the rights of tort victims against the policy of preserving the
institutional stability of unions. One commentator has suggested,
however, that unions will cynically revise their rules in order to limit
20 7
their exposure to tort liability.
Second, this radical shift from tort immunity to potential liability
occurred through the political process. Whether one approves or disapproves of the Conservative Party's policies, the Thatcher government won free elections and enacted legislation. This contrasts
sharply with the American experience which allows individual state
judicial systems to abrogate a national policy favoring labor unions.
Section II illustrated the various approaches taken on the issue of
a union's tort liability. As this survey shows, there is no uniform
treatment of the appropriate proof standard for union liability. Jurisdictions vary in their treatment of unions, ranging from strong protection to refusal to extend any form of shield against unwarranted tort
liability.
It is clear that the federal standard reflects a national policy
favoring the preservation of unions as institutions. Those jurisdictions that extend protection to unions in tort actions base their deci203. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 n.5, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
204. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 15.
205. One commentator suggests that English employers have not rushed to sue unions
under the 1982 Act. Part II of the 1984 Trade Union Act allows parties to sue unions when
the union fails to comply with the requirements for a strike vote. There are no statutory limits
on damage awards in these suits. See Benedictus, supra note 191, at 188-89.
206. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 15(4)-(5).
207. Benedictus, supra note 191, at 187.
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sions on respect for the national policy. Those jurisdictions that
refuse to recognize any special status for unions avoid any discussion
of national policy considerations. The next section will closely examine the reasons California courts have chosen to treat unions like
any other agency tortfeasor.
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF

JR. NORTON

V. GENERAL TEAMSTERS

We now re-visit JR. Norton to analyze why the California appellate court opted to impose common law agency liability on unions.
Initially, it is necessary to explore the federal preemption issue in order to determine why the court was not bound to accept the "clear
proof" standard. This Comment will then examine whether national
policy considerations should have prevailed over state concerns.
A.

Preemption

In JR. Norton, the Teamsters contended that the federal "clear
proof" standard preempted state agency liability principles. 20 8 The
concept of preemption can be traced to the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution which makes laws passed by Congress in
accordance with the Constitution supreme over state laws. 20 9 Congress has the power to enact legislation in the labor relations area
under the commerce clause. 210 A brief review of the preemption doctrine is essential to understanding why the union raised the issue and
why the JR. Norton court held that the "clear proof" standard did
not preempt the traditional tort liability standards.
The three branches of the preemption doctrine pertaining to federal regulation of labor relations are categorized as follows: (1) matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB"); (2) matters intended by Congress to be unregulated; and (3) matters requiring the application of federal substantive
law. 211 The first branch is governed by the Supreme Court rule an208. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 437, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
209. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
210. Id. art. I, § 8. The constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act was upheld
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Norris-LaGuardia Act
survived challenge in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
211. For an overview of the current state of preemption, see Gomez, Preemption and Preclusion of Employee Common Law Rights by Federaland State Statutes, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J.
44 (1989).

782

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 12:753

nounced in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.2 12 Under

the Garmon rule, state courts lack jurisdiction where the conduct is
either protected under section 7, or prohibited under section 8 of the
NLRA. 21 3 The NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over such conduct
14
even if the conduct is only "arguably" reached by the NLRA.2
The second branch of the preemption doctrine, from Machinists
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, concerns conduct

which Congress intended to leave unregulated. 21 5 The national labor
policy favors management and labor developing their own relationships without intrusion from either federal or state agencies. For example, the courts consistently
16
bargaining tactics.2

override

attempts

to

regulate

The third branch involves suits for breach of contract and other
matter s under the LMRA. This branch does not necessarily preempt
state court jurisdiction, but it does require the application of federal
substantive law. 21 7 This branch of the preemption doctrine recognizes
the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts in certain labor relations
cases. 21 8 Federal substantive law controls when a determination of

the controversy requires interpretation of the collective bargaining
19
agreement or federal statutory rights.2

It is unclear from the JR. Norton opinion which aspect of pre212. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state tort damages reversed where union engaged in peaceful
picketing).
213. Id. at 245. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act pertains to unfair labor
practices by either an employer or the union. For the text of section 7, see supra note 1.
214. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
215. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)
(state law barring refusal to work overtime preempted where refusal was a bargaining tactic
which Congress intended to leave to the parties' own devices).
216. Id. See also American Ship Builders Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (employer
lockout of employees in anticipation of strike viewed as legitimate bargaining tactic not subject
to regulation).
217. See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state tort of
retaliatory discharge is not preempted). See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985) (preemption proper when state law inextricably intertwined with interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement).
218. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal courts authorized to fashion body of federal law for enforcement of rights under the LMRA); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962) (state courts allowed jurisdiction in breach of contract suit but must apply federal law).
219. See supra note 206. See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) (alleged
promises by employer to strikebreakers does not require interpretation of union contract, nor
does it involve statutory rights).
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emption the union argued was controlling. 220 Since the NLRB has
expressly declined to exercise jurisdiction over state tort claims, the
union could not succeed in claiming that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 22 ' As for the argument that strike violence is
an unregulated bargaining tactic, the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld state court jurisdiction over tortious conduct claims arising
222
out of labor disputes.
Given this relatively clear case law, the union most likely argued
that the "clear proof" standard was a matter of federal law imposed
upon the states. 22 3 Case law suggests two approaches where federal

substantive law has preempted state law. First, the statutory text may
expressly require federal law to be applied.2 24 Second, preemption
may be achieved by weighing national policy more heavily than local
policy considerations. 22 5 The J.R. Norton court correctly found that
there was no statutory preemption of state agency liability. 226 However, the court did not adequately address whether the "clear proof"
227
standard should preempt agency liability as a matter of policy.
220. See J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890,
208 Cal. App. 3d 430, 437, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
221. See Teamsters, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe Co.), 202 NLRB Dec. (CCH) No. 43, 399,
399 n.5 (1973). Since NLRB jurisdiction is confined to the NLRA by section 10 of the Act,
section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia could not logically apply to NLRB proceedings. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1982).
222. Some of the leading cases allowing state court jurisdiction over tortious conduct
claims include: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978) (state courts may reach trespass in violation of state law even where picketing
is peaceful); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, reh'g denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958) (violence); Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state court may enjoin violence but not peaceful picketing);
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (threats of
violence).
223. For the JR. Norton court's discussion of the preemption issue, see 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 437-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250-54.
224. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982). This
section provides:
Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of a violation . . . may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and
provisions of section 185 ... or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties,
and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
Id. See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1985) (where the Court
announced the doctrine).
225. See infra notes 283-287 and accompanying text.
226. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 253-54, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
227. Id. at 441-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252-54.
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California was not statutorily bound by the "clear proof" standard. Even in its original form, the Garmon rule allowed for exceptions. 228 State courts have jurisdiction and may apply state
substantive law where the action is only of "peripheral concern" to
federal law. 229 The Garmon Court did not recognize exceptions to
federal preemption without reservations. The Court noted, albeit
without resolving, the potential conflict between state remedies and
national labor policy. 2 30 The Court stated that state courts should
exercise caution when adjudicating in the field of labor relations precisely because of the potential overlap between national and state
23
concerns. 1
The JR. Norton court had little difficulty in exempting agency
liability standards from federal preemption. 2 32 The NLRB certainly
has neither express nor arguable jurisdiction over a union's tortious
conduct. 233 There is also no support for an argument that Congress
234
intended tortious conduct to be unregulated.
As noted in JR. Norton, the state tort action fit within the exceptions to the preemption rule. 235 The court reasoned that Congress
had not prescribed a substitute for state tort remedies and that protection of citizens from violence had traditionally been a matter of local
concern. 236 Thus, the court found a compelling state interest to extend tort remedies to injured parties, even in cases where the injuries
23 7
arose from a labor dispute.

228. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
229. See id. (maintaining domestic peace is a prime example of a purely local concern).
230. See id. In Garmon, the Court stated:
It may be that an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict
with the active assertion of federal authority. The same may be true of the incidence
of a particular state injunction. To sanction either involves a conflict with federal
policy in that it involves two law-making sources to govern. In fact, since remedies
form an ingredient scheme of regulation, to allow the state to grant a remedy here
which has been withheld from the NLRB only accentuates the danger.
Id. at 247.
231. Id. at 246-47.
232. See J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890,
208 Cal. App. 3d 430, 437-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250-54, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
233. The court did not address NLRB jurisdiction. But see Teamsters, Local 901 (Lock
Joint Pipe Co.), 202 NLRB Dec. (CCH) No. 43, 399 (1973).
234. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
235. For example, in JR. Norton, the court stated that "the United States Supreme Court
has long recognized the power of state courts to award tort damages under state law for violent
conduct." Id., 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
236. Id., 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
237. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 440, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
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JR. Norton held that the "clear proof" language of the NorrisLaGuardia Act did not preempt state evidentiary standards because
the federal Act was textually limited to the federal judiciary. 23 8 This
construction is consistent with an earlier California decision which
expressed doubt about congressional authority to reach state remedies
through the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 239 Given the traditional state police power over violence, combined with the absence of a clear federal
mandate, the JR. Norton court applied the ordinary civil "preponder24
ance of the evidence" standard. 0
In another argument before the court, the union contended that
the federal standard should govern since California's labor policy generally resembled the national policy. 24 1 The argument invited the
court to balance state and national concerns. In rejecting this argument, the JR. Norton court relied on the purported silence of the
California legislature. While the California legislature adopted an
anti-injunction statute similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it has not
24 2
adopted an equivalent of the section 6 "clear proof" legislation.
The court found that the silence in the statute affirmatively
demonstrated the legislature's intent not to impose a "clear proof"
standard in state court actions against unions. 24 3 The court found it
inappropriate to create its own evidentiary standard when the legisla44
ture had ample opportunity but declined to do S0.2
On the one hand, the court's attitude reflects a reluctance to
usurp the legislative function. On the other hand, the court is argua238.
239.

Id. at 439, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
Id. at 441, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252. The court cited McCarroll v. Los Angeles County

District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322 (1957). Chief Justice Traynor's
views in McCarroll, regarding Congress' inability to deprive state courts of their remedial
power, were later adopted by the Supreme Court in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247 (1970).
240. The NLRB itself appeared to invite state tort claims by its refusal to offer remedies in
the context of union violence. See Teamsters, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe Co.), 202 NLRB

Dec. (CCH) No. 43, 399, 399 n.5 (1973).
241. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 441, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
242. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 441-42, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 253, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989). The

court referred to the Moscone Act, codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1989).
243. See JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 442, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 253. The court stated
that -[t]he omission of a provision contained in a foreign statute providing the model for
action by the Legislature is a strong indication that the Legislature did not intend to import
such provision into the state statute." Id.
244. Id. at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 254. The court cited with approval similar reasoning by
the Arizona court in Carter-Glogau Laboratories v. Construction Laborers' Local 383, 153
Ariz. 351, 736 P.2d 1163 (1968). See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
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bly engaging in judicial legislation by indirectly undermining the national policy. While the JR. Norton court sought to ascertain the
California legislature's intent, it did not address the congressional intent behind the "clear proof" standard. 245 Thus, the court adopted a
narrow reading of preemption.
B.

Form over Substance

The JR. Norton court was confronted with egregious strike misconduct that included outright violence endorsed by the local
union. 246 Given the facts, a jury may very well have found the Teamsters union liable under any evidentiary standard. 24 7 Nevertheless,
California's rejection of the "clear proof" standard in determining
union liability for tort claims is subject to criticism. For example, the
JR. Norton court failed to balance the national policy underlying the
"clear proof" standard against state interests.
1. National Policy Considerations
As discussed in Section II, the primary purpose of the "clear
proof" standard is to ensure that unions are not financially destroyed
as a result of the conduct of a few individuals who are beyond the
union's control. 24 8 The JR. Norton opinion never addressed the underlying policy considerations favoring the "clear proof" standard.
The court also failed to consider judicial comity-the same case in the
federal district court would require the use of the higher "clear
proof" standard. The court's holding was premised on the absence of
jurisdictional preemption and the enactment of an anti-injunction
statute by the California legislature that did not include the "clear
249
proof" standard.
Furthermore, the JR. Norton court cited language from Gibbs to
support its adoption of ordinary agency principles established by a
"preponderance of the evidence" as the rule governing state tort actions against unions. 250 The very same passage in Gibbs, however,
comments on the validity of the national policy protecting unions
245. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 437-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250-54.
246. For a summary of the conduct which the court found offensive, see JR. Norton, 208
Cal. App. 3d at 435-37, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
247. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 436-37, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248-49, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
248. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1966).
249. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 442, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52, 253.
250. Id. at 439, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 736).
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from unwarranted tort liability. 25' The JR. Norton court also cited
Ramsey to support the proposition that Congress did not intend a
higher standard of proof in civil damage actions.252 Ramsey is inapposite as it merely bifurcates which elements of the case must be established by "clear proof." 25 3 The Ramsey opinion holds that the
underlying elements of a tort action must be proven by the "preponderance of the evidence." However, the issue of union responsibility
254
must be established by the "clear proof" standard.
While the JR. Norton court cited the appropriate federal authorities, it misinterpreted their meanings. Congress enacted limited tort
protection for unions because unions serve the national policy favoring collective bargaining. 255 Gibbs and Ramsey clearly articulate both
the importance and the validity of this national policy. JR. Norton,
in effect, turned these cases on their heads by weakening unions' protection from unwarranted tort liability.
The JR. Norton opinion adopted the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in addition to holding that common law agency principles govern tort actions against unions. 256 This rubric of common
law agency also encompasses the doctrine of respondeat superior.257
Arguably, when liability is predicated on actual participation, authorization or ratification, the evidentiary standard may not be significant.
By contrast, where respondeat superior is the theory of liability, the
choice of an evidentiary standard may be determinative.
The practical effect of coupling the "preponderance of the evidence" standard with the doctrine of respondeat superioris to expose
unions to a form of strict liability. 258 Under the California scheme,
the mere fact that damage is caused by a picketer is sufficient to ex251. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 736-37. See also supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
252. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 439, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989) (quoting
Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1971)).
253. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
254. Ramsey, 401 U.S. at 310-11.
255. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1932). See also LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, supra note 9, at 27. The authors describe the NLRA as "the statute which placed the
full power and influence of the national government behind trade unionism." Id.
256. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54.
257. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 n.5, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 242 (1989). For
a discussion on respondeat superior liability, see supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
258. See Gajkowski v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 A.2d 533, 544 (Pa. 1988). See
supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
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pose the entire union to liability. 259 Even where the picketer harbors
an individual motive or a personal grudge, the union is liable unless it
disproves its connection with the individual tortfeasor's act. 26 ° Thus,
the net effect of the JR. Norton holding is to increase the probability
that a union will be held liable in a state tort action.
While JR. Norton is silent on the national policy towards protecting unions as institutional entities, the opinion does express disdain for the union's behavior. 26 1 The court's opinion may have been
influenced by the union's egregious conduct. In any event, California's position, as illustrated by JR. Norton, reflects an implicit policy
choice that redressing private wrongs outweighs the national policy
toward union liability. 262 In other words, unions are not entitled to
any form of judicial protection and, as a result, have become "deep
'263
pockets.

2.

State Considerations

As previously discussed, the JR. Norton decision rests on the
absence of either congressional or state legislative mandates to adopt
the "clear proof" standard. The court, however, did have a choice.
While the "preponderance of the evidence" standard is the general
rule in California civil actions, there is an exception where a different
standard is "otherwise provided by law." 264 This alternate provision
encompasses constitutional, statutory and decisional law. 265 Hence,
when confronted by compelling policy reasons, California courts may
266
adopt a higher evidentiary standard.

259. The jury in J.R. Norton was given a respondeat superiorinstruction. See JR. Norton,
208 Cal. App. 3d at 438 n.5, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.5.
260. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 675, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964) (in tort action against union company need not show
damages caused by tort and by other factors-"substantial factor" rule). See also Perez v. Van
Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1968). This problem approaches the "burden shifting" discussed in Humphreys, supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 445, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (the court
discusses the union's behavior as grounds for affirming the punitive damage award).
262. For an argument that unions no longer need any form of deference, such as the "clear
proof" standard, see Note, The Liability of Labor Unionsfor Picket Line Assaults, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 600, 622-23 (1973).
263. Id.
264. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1989).

265. See id. § 160.
266. See, e.g., Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1984) (adopting higher standard of proof for treatment to be administered to involuntarily
committed mental patient).
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The J.R. Norton court could have rejected the "clear proof"
standard on the grounds of countervailing state policy considerations.
The federal standard does not appear to conflict with any state policies because it does not absolve unions from liability. 267 California
could still protect its citizens while adopting the federal standard for
union liability. The stricter federal standard merely places a higher
burden on a plaintiff to show the nexus between the union and the
alleged harm, but it avoids the result of tort liability based on a
wrongdoer's status as a union member. 26 8 The court in JR. Norton
not only glossed over the implications of the federal policy but also
269
failed to articulate any relevant state policy concerns.
Beyond legislative silence, the J.R. Norton opinion did not explicitly cite any compelling state policy considerations that supported
their rejection of the "clear proof" standard. 270 Legislative silence,
however, does not represent an affirmative expression of public policy.
On the one hand, this form of deference to the legislature can be seen
as judicial restraint. 271 On the other hand, this reliance on silence to
determine legislative intent may be seen as an abdication of judicial
responsibility. 272 Although there may be many reasons for legislative
inaction, the courts do have a positive obligation to resolve controver273
sies before them.
It would be hard to fault a California court for adopting the
"clear proof" standard, given its well entrenched status in the federal
courts and the fact that other states have also adopted this standard. 274 Moreover, the "clear proof" standard represents an express
267. See, e.g., Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
268. See id.; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
269. The typical strike situation at best represents institutionalized conflict. At its worst, a
strike can rapidly escalate into warfare. Given the inherent volatility of a strike, holding unions liable in tort may simply be unfair, absent proof of true union responsibility for the tort.
For an account of a recent strike, see Greyhound Bus Crushes Striking Driver, L.A. Times,
Mar. 4, 1990, at AI, col. 4.
270. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 441-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 253-54, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
271. See, e.g., Buchanan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 Wash. 2d 508, 617 P.2d
1004 (1980); Carter-Glogau Laboratories v. Construction Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz. 351,
736 P.2d 1163 (1968). The court in J.R. Norton cited both of these cases. See J.R. Norton, 208
Cal. App. 3d at 441 n.9, 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252 n.9, 253.
272. See, e.g., Sowels v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 112 Mich. App. 616, 317
N.W.2d 195 (1981). See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
273. See Buchanan, 94 Wash. 2d at 517-20, 617 P.2d at 1009-10 (dissenting opinion of J.
Horowitz, criticizing the concept of ascertaining legislative intent through silence or inaction).
274. For a list of those states which have adopted the "clear proof" standard, see supra
notes 98-115 and 134-158 and accompanying text.
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public policy. While there may be state considerations which are
more compelling than the national policy, they are not expressed in
the J.R. Norton decision. The court's failure to address national policy concerns and to articulate an overriding state interest undermines
27
the legitimacy of the decision.

IV.

THE VIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD

The main theme of this section is that the "clear proof" standard
remains useful. There is also a principled means of justifying judicial
adoption of heightened protection for unions in tort actions. The uniform adoption of the "clear proof" standard would serve the national
interest without denigrating the rights of tort victims. Given today's
judicial and social environment, however, it is doubtful whether
courts will move toward protecting unions from unwarranted tort
liability.
A.

FurtheringNational Labor Policy

Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has suggested that the
national policy favoring the existence of free trade unions has been
repealed. The "clear proof" standard was enacted to promote labor
unions as institutional entities. 2 76 Both the national policy and the
reasons underlying its enactment retain their importance today.
1. Pragmatic Concerns
The "clear proof" standard has endured since the adoption of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Over this period, countless federal cases have applied this standard. 277 The lesson to be gleaned
from the federal courts is that unions can be held accountable when
there is a clear nexus between the union and the alleged misconduct.
Conversely, misconduct by a person associated with the union, but
278
beyond its practical control, will not expose a union to liability.
275. The decertification of the Vargas decision, which expressly relied on JR. Norton,
raises some doubt regarding the state of the law in the area of union tort liability. See supra
note 4.
276. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1932).
277. See, e.g., Kerry Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 637 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.
1981) (affirming $1.2 million damage award against union where there was "clear proof" that
union agent participated in acts of violence and interfered with contractual relationships at the
union's request); Ritchie v. United Mine Workers of Am., 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969) (reversing state damage award against union where persons responsible for property damage were
never identified).
278. See also Annotation, Liability of Labor Union or Its Membershipfor Torts Committed
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Congress has not repealed the "clear proof" standard nor has the
Supreme Court overruled Gibbs, despite criticism from some commentators. 279 State court adoption of the "clear proof" standard
would have the salutary effect of discouraging forum shopping since
parties would receive similar treatment whether they were in federal
or state court. 28 0 Attorneys, especially those representing national organizations, would appreciate uniform rules governing union tort
liability.
The California approach may encourage plaintiffs to draft their
complaints in a manner that would avoid federal jurisdiction in order
to rely exclusively on state tort remedies.2 8 ' Such an outcome fosters
the potential for conflict cited by the Garmon court and further detracts from a national labor policy. 282 In short, the relative success of
the "clear proof" standard and the principles of comity (avoidance of
forum shopping) tend to operate in favor of state adoption of the federal standard.
2.

A Conceptual Approach Justifying the Adoption of
the "Clear Proof" Standard

Aside from pragmatic considerations, precedent exists for adopt28 3
ing a federal standard even when there is an existing state standard.
In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, the United States Supreme
Court stated that a libel action based on materials published during a
labor dispute was not preempted by the NLRA. 28 4 The Court went
on, however, to hold that normal state libel standards should not apby Officers, Members, Pickets or Others in Connection with Lawful PrimaryLabor Activities, 36
A.L.R. 3d 405 (1971 & Supp. 1989).
279. For arguments that Section 6 should be repealed, see Note, supra note 262; A.
THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY
COURTS, LEGISLATURES AND THE

NLRB 496 (1983).

280. See Hiestand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 666 P.2d 671 (1983).
281. A plaintiff's choice of forum may be determined by whether a defendant local union
can satisfy a judgment. Where a local union has sufficient funds, the rational plaintiff will now
use California state courts because of their more lenient evidentiary standards. A party may
lose its forum if it must rely on the national or international parent union and a motion for
removal is granted. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (Supp. 1989).
282. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). See
also Schwartz & Parrot, A New Look at FederalLabor Law Preemption: Unionized Employees
Claims in State Courts, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 297 (1988) (examines "master of complaint" rule of national policy).
283. This discussion is based upon Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
284. Id. at 57-58.
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ply. Instead, the Court imposed an actual harm and malice test.28 5
The Court feared that in defamation cases the prospect of excessive
damages would pose "a threat to the stability of labor unions ....",286
To justify the higher standard, the Court reasoned: "[iln order that
the recognition of legitimate state interests does not interfere with effective administration of national labor policy, the possibility of such
''
consequences must be minimized. 287
For any state court facing a request to adopt the federal standard, Linn, by analogy, offers a principled justification. The "clear
proof" standard still allows protection of state interests, but also provides some protection against unwarranted tort liability where the
union did not participate, authorize or condone the offensive conduct.
Linn, therefore, reflects a careful balancing of the state interest in protecting citizens from libel and the institutional stability of unions.
Linn reconciles these interests by requiring a higher level of proof in
28 8
libel actions.
Every lawsuit requires a judicial balancing of interests. This balancing is absent from the decisions of those states which reject any
form of special protection for union tort liability. These cases uniformly avoid discussion of national policy considerations. 28 9 While
courts may fear charges of judicial activism, applying the federal
"clear proof" standard could hardly be considered activism. Perhaps
those courts rejecting the federal standard are actually engaging in
legislation by judicial fiat.
If labor law is viewed as a national concern, the issue boils down
to basic principles of federalism. There are both pragmatic and principled reasons supporting the protection of unions from unwarranted
tort liability. The JR. Norton court could have elected the "clear
proof" standard as a matter of state law. 290 The court also could have
balanced the national policy of protecting unions from unwarranted
tort liability against tort victims' rights of redress. Since the "clear
285. Id. at 64-65. The test is derived from New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
286. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64.
287. Id.
288. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966).
289. Those states which have rejected any form of special protection for unions are Washington, Massachusetts, Indiana, North Carolina, Arizona, Virginia and California. See supra
the discussion associated with each respective state.
290. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1989).
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proof" standard serves both of these interests, the national policy
should prevail.
B.

The Decline of National Policy

'29
"As between present law and no law, I'd prefer no law." 1
Although Congress did not extend the "clear proof" standard to
state courts, it is difficult to understand how courts could ignore the
national policy concerns. Current national trends may clarify this difficulty and help place the J.R. Norton decision in better perspective.
This section examines the present state of unions as institutions and
then revisits the current status of the doctrine of preemption. When
unions lack vitality and courts lack a legal mechanism to apply federal principles, perhaps the national policy itself lacks substance.

1. The Decline of Unionization
Union influence has declined in recent years. Unions represent
some 17 percent of the work force, which is a decline from 25.5 percent in 1953 .292 Unions have also ceased to be a center of social life
for its members. 293 The inability of unions to convince a greater percentage of the work force to join may enable courts to ignore the
existence of a national labor policy. Perhaps it is no coincidence that
those states which have adopted heightened protection for unions also
tend to have strong rates of union membership. 294
In both Gibbs and Linn, the United States Supreme Court made
strong statements about the importance of unions as social institutions.295 In a series of relatively recent decisions, the Court has rendered decisions arguably weakening the institutional base of union
power. One of the keys to union strength has been the concept of
solidarity, sometimes enforced through union discipline. The Court
has eroded this concept by holding that a union member may resign
from the union at any time, including during a strike, and thereby
291. Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, quoted in Tolchin, Labor ChiefLaments
State of Nation's Labor Laws, DAILY J., Sept. 4, 1989, at 2.

292.

See

LABOR RELATIONS LAW,

supra note 9, at 42.

293. See, A. GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 183-84.
294. Id. at 179 (discussing geographical variations in union strength). Those states which
have extended special protection to unions in tort actions are Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Michigan, Kansas, Florida and Rhode Island.
295. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
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avoid union discipline. 296
The seniority system has been recognized as one of the prime
sources of job security for union members. The Supreme Court recently refused to find an unfair labor practice when the employer refused to restore the full benefits of seniority to flight attendants at the
end of a strike. 297 Finally, the Court attacked the union's purse
strings by placing limits on the types of expenditures a union can pass
along to those members "forced" to pay dues or fees as a result of
contractual agreements. 298 These cases illustrate a tendency to erode
unions as institutions. Judicial limitations on union discipline, seniority systems and union treasuries can only further the process of lowering the utility of unions, both in the eyes of its members and perhaps,
in the eyes of state judges.
There are other non-legal factors which erode the institutional
strength of unions. For example, the availability of television and
general material prosperity probably erode union solidarity more than
a court decision. 299 When an individual is satisfied, the need for collective activity is not obvious. Furthermore, individual members no
longer need to rely on union's to furnish social activities. 300 Thus, unions are no longer at the center of the individual member's social or
30 1
economic life.
Labor legislation favoring unions was enacted at a time when unions were powerful social and political institutions. 30 2 As unions lose
their institutional vitality, the underlying national policies will also
lose their meaning. This institutional erosion of unions may be inevitable, but state courts should not accelerate the process.
296. See Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
297. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct.
1225 (1989).
298. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). For a discussion
of the effect of the Beck decision in the entertainment industry, see Comment, The Beck Decision: Will It Divide the Entertainment Unions, 9 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 425 (1989).
299. See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 179.
300. Id.
301. Many collective bargaining arrangements between labor and management have a long
history, e.g. the auto manufacturers and the UAW. Even where individuals are members of a
union, they may never have voted to be represented by their union. This "passive" form of
membership, as opposed to active participation in an organizing campaign, further distances
the individual from the union.
302. See LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 9, at 24-28.
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2.

The Demise of Preemption

While Congress may enact labor legislation, it did not extend the
"clear proof" standard to state courts. Nor has Congress enacted a
statutory scheme to address union tort liability. This congressional
inaction creates a threshold obstacle in applying federal preemption
principles to state tort actions against unions. Although the threshold
is not insurmountable, it is by no means an easy process. The current
status of labor law preemption makes it even more difficult.
The public, and certainly potential victims, are justified in their
concern with preventing violence during labor disputes. Preemption
presupposes the existence of alternative jurisdictions or remedies.
Some state courts have declined to find that the federal "clear proof"
standard has any preemptive force. 30 3 When the NLRB takes a
"hands off" approach to union violence, state courts may feel obligated to fill the void. 30 4 Once the matter is before a state court, it may
be awkward to apply a federal standard of proof. After all, if there
were an effective federal remedy through the NLRB, the parties
30 5
would not be in state court.
Current labor law preemption doctrine is in a state of flux. The
uncertainty of whether a particular issue is preempted may be turning
the doctrine into a dead letter. 30 6 State judges are not compelled to
preempt state evidentiary rules with a federal policy because the federal system (courts, Congress and the NLRB) has ceded tort jurisdiction to the states.30 7 Indeed, the only principled way to apply the
"clear proof" standard in state courts is to adopt a Linn-type analysis-finding a federal policy preemption. 30 8 A Linn approach seems
contrary to the current trend away from a coherent doctrine of federal
30 9
labor law preemption.
In sum, there are powerful reasons to support the adoption of the
federal standard of "clear proof" in state court actions against unions.
303. J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 890, 208
Cal. App. 3d 430, 440-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-54, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 242 (1989).
304. See Teamsters, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe Co.), 202 NLRB Dec. (CCH) No. 43, 399
(1973).
305. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
306. Neither labor nor management seems to be pleased with the current state of preemption. See, e.g., State Labor Law Development, 4 THE LABOR LAWYER 349, 370 (1988). "[T]he
Court appears to have gone from a liberalized preemption which emphasized national uniformity to an eviscerated doctrine where the exceptions have virtually swallowed the rule." Id.
307. JR. Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 440-41, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
308. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966).
309. State Labor Law Development, supra note 306, at 369-70.
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The reasons are both pragmatic and fair. On the other hand, there
are forces, both extra-judicial and within the federal and state legal
systems, which may explain the reluctance to adopt a higher standard
of proof. Abandoning union tort liability issues to the individual
states has created an unpredictable legal situation. Liability depends
more on the caprice of geography, rather than on consistent legal
principles. The question becomes whether there are viable alternatives to this state of affairs.
V.

CONCLUSION

American labor policy has long favored the existence of a free
trade union movement. The "clear proof" standard mandated by section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an express statement of this
strong national policy. The "clear proof" standard, both textually
and through the case law, protects labor unions from unwarranted
tort liability. The operative word is "unwarranted," since the na3 10
tional policy does not immunize labor unions from all tort liability.
In spite of this relatively straightforward national policy, states
are free to devise their own approaches. Some states chose to apply
the same standards to unions as they apply to any corporate entity.
Such decisions refer to legislative silence or strict statutory construction. Conspicuously absent from this line of decisions is the recognition that unions, as associations of individuals, are not equivalent to
other corporate entities. Another line of cases has extended protection to unions in tort actions. These cases make reference to the national policy favoring labor unions, with one decision evoking
3 11
concerns about federalism.
This Comment also illustrated the English approach, which
through its statutory scheme and common law, significantly protects
the union against liability resulting from the tortious conduct of an
individual member. The English experience is instructive because it is
a modern effort to address union tort liability. The English statutory
scheme attempts to reconcile the competing interests of unions and
tort victims.
When individual states are left free to their own whims, the situation can properly be categorized as judicial laissezfaire. The resulting
uncertainty about unions' legal status bears some resemblance to the
time prior to the enactment of protective labor legislation. When the
310.
311.

See Annotation, supra note 278.
See Hiestand v. Amalgamated Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 666 P.2d 671 (1983).
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issue is truly one of local concern, there is nothing wrong with leaving
the states to experiment. When a national policy has been articulated,
however, it is undemocratic to allow state judiciaries to erode this
policy without a single vote being cast.
There are both short-term and long-term solutions. California
courts should immediately reassess the position of union tort liability.
The J.R. Norton decision is persuasive authority, yet the California
Supreme Court ordered the Vargas decision, which expressly relied on
J.R. Norton, decertified. 31 2 Needless to say, this leaves the state of law
in California unsettled. The California legislature could also intervene to legislatively overrule JR. Norton by enacting the "clear
proof" standard.
Over the long term, it is time to re-evaluate our national labor
policy. Norris-LaGuardia, the NLRA and the LMRA, which comprise the three central bodies of labor law, were enacted at different
times in our political history. Each of these statutes, as well as the
other related employment law statutes, were enacted to serve different
needs and interests. For example, American labor law has at times
sought to foster union growth, while at other times attempted to
equalize the bargaining power between union and management.
Time, as well as conflicting state law, has obscured our national
policy. The "clear proof" evidentiary standard was enacted to further the preservation of unions. "Clear proof" may, or may not, be
relevant today. Congress is the most appropriate place to articulate
our national labor policy. Allowing various judicial systems to enact
policy by default is inappropriate and undemocratic. Perhaps a comprehensive revision of our statutes would reconcile the conflicting interests present in our current laws.
The United States should reaffirm the policy favoring a free trade
union movement. Regardless of one's attitudes towards unions, they
serve an important societal function as the countervailing force to organized capital. Unions, at their best, are the most effectivemeans of
empowering people with a voice on the central issues in their lives.
As the poet Yeats so eloquently wrote:
"Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold;
312.

See supra note 4.
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